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THE DARK HORSE OF DRUG ABUSE: LEGAL ISSUES OF
ADMINISTERING PERFORMANCE-ENHANCING
DRUGS TO RACEHORSES
I. INTRODUCTION
"Could you imagine different human athlete drug policies for teams in
different states in the National Football League or National Basketball
Association ? "I
On June 22, 2007, the Kentucky Horse Racing Authority
("KHRA") searched the stables of trainer Patrick Biancone and
found vials of cobra venom, a Class A drug.2 This was not the first
time that horseracing authorities caught a prominent trainer with
performance-enhancing drugs.3 National horseracing authorities
are increasingly concerned with steroid abuse, thanks in part to the
1. Bill Heller, Bettors hurt by secret positives, THOROUGHBRED TIMES Nov. 15,
2003, http://www.thoroughbredtimes.com/commentary/2003/November/15/
Bettors-hurt-by-secret-positives.aspx (arguing for national standards of perform-
ance-enhancing drugs in horseracing). Perhaps a more fitting national authority
could be modeled on the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"). See
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988) (describing
organization of NCAA); see also William C. Martin, Comment, The Graduate Transfer
Rule: Is the NCAA Unnecessarily Hindering Student-Athletes from Traversing the Educa-
tional Paths They Desire?, 15 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 103, 106-07 (2008) (describing
NCAA Council as "ruling body").
2. See Marty McGee, Cobra Venom Said to be in Biancone Barn, ESPN.coM, July 4,
2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/sports/horse/news/story?id=2926083 [hereinaf-
ter McGee, Cobra Venom] (reporting on Biancone's pending hearing). Kentucky
authorities searched Biancone's barn after one of his horses tested positive for a
derivative of caffeine and a derivative of an inhalant, both banned substances from
Kentucky horseracing. See id. Biancone denied that he put the cobra venom in
the stable, but settled with the KHRA on the penalty: one-year suspension from
racing in Kentucky beginning November 1, 2007, though he can still collect prize
money from horses already entered under his name and can race in other states.
See Trainer Barred, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2007, at D4 (describing terms of Biancone's
suspension). A Class A drug is defined as a drug that is likely to alter a horse's
performance, has no therapeutic value and is not approved by the Food and Drug
Administration. See 810 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 1:028 (2007).
3. See Leading Horse Trainers Todd Pletcher and Scott Lake Suspended for Illegal
Drug Use, HORSE RAcING NEWS, Jan. 5, 2007, http://www.horseracingnews.net/
horse-racing-industry/leading-horse-trainers-todd-pletcher-and-scott-lake-sus-
pended-for-drug-use.php [hereinafter Leading Horse Trainers] (describing several
trainers accused of administering banned drugs to horses). In 2005, Rick Dutrow
violated two rules on drugs in New York and the New York State Racing and Wa-
gering Board suspended him for 120 days, which was later reduced to sixty days.
See id. Bobby Frankel's horse tested positive for morphine in California in 2000,
but Frankel's case was dismissed in 2006. See id. Steve Asmussen's horses failed a
drug test in Louisiana and in New Mexico, each violation carrying a potential six-
month suspension. See id. In 2006, Scot Lake was suspended for thirty days for a
(199)
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unflattering attention from Congress on Major League Baseball.4
In fact, members of the National Thoroughbred Racing Association
have approached the United States Congress with a model statute
regulating steroid use in horseracing in order to deflect a blanket
ban on steroids. 5 Ultimately, however, each state's horseracing
agency is responsible for regulating performance-enhancing drug
use in horseracing. 6
Predicting how each of the individual state agencies will re-
spond to the model statute is difficult because of their disparate
treatment of violations.7 Additionally, horseracing agencies have
gained a reputation for lax enforcement of their doping rules.8
Often the penalties are not enough to deter trainers, veterinarians
and owners from administering illegal drugs to their horses, largely
because of the stiff competition and enormous investments of time
and money in racehorses. 9
drug violation in New York while he was serving a thirty-day suspension for drug
violations in Delaware. See id.
4. See Tom LaMarra, Racing Officials, Legislators Discuss Racehorse Steroids, THE
HORSE, Jan. 9, 2008, http://www.thehorse.com/ViewArticle.aspx?ID=11134 [here-
inafter LaMarra, Racing Officials] (discussing how racing officials met with Con-
gressmen to discuss steroid regulation in horseracing). The horse auctioning
industry, however, has already implemented a voluntary testing policy. See id.
5. See id. (reporting NTRA's lobbying of Congress). The National Thorough-
bred Racing Association controlled the preemptive approach of Congress, hoping
that news of steroid regulation within the horseracing industry would deflect Con-
gressional meddling. See id.
6. See id. (noting that each horseracing state is responsible for its own regula-
tions). Some states have already adopted regulations on steroids that will ban their
use on race day. See id.
7. See id. (discussing how each state has varying sanctions for illicit drug use).
Different state agencies differ in how long to ban steroids before a race, ranging
from 45-120 days. See also Tom LaMarra, Cohesive Rules for Racehorse Steroids Sought,
THE HORSE, Jan. 11, 2008, http://www.thehorse.com/ViewArticle.aspx?ID=1 1151
(reporting on view that regulations on steroids need to be national). Horses travel
state to state to race in competitions, so a uniform rule that all states implement
could focus more on the policy behind banning steroid use than on penalizing
trainers. See id. Alan Foreman, CEO of the Thoroughbred Horsemen's Associa-
tion, said, "I believe there is a growing sense [the horseracing industry] need [s] a
coordinated approach." Id.
8. See Heller, supra note 1 (noting administration of drugs epogen and Lasix
to horses was not always public); see also Leading Horse Trainers supra note 3 (listing
several trainers with relatively light or no sanctions).
9. See Andrew Beyer, A Beyer's Guide for Racehorses, WASH. POST, June 3, 2003,
DOI (examining investments in racehorses). Racehorses can sell at auction for
more than a million dollars, and the average upkeep for a racehorse is between
$30,000 and $50,000 per year. See id. Furthermore, the average earnings for an
American racehorse are only about $16,000. See id.; see alsoJohn Worden, They Sue
Horses, Don't They.?: Understanding Equine Law, 26 SAN FRANcisco ATr'y 22, 22
(2000) (noting both owners and bettors invest significant amounts of money in
horseracing). "In no other business pursuit are hundreds of thousands and even
millions of dollars won, lost, awarded, and forfeited based on the extremely
[Vol. 16: p. 199
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This article will explore the history of performance-enhancing
drugs in horseracing and evaluate the current status of horseracing
drug statutes. 10 Section II examines the different elements that af-
fect drug usage in horseracing, including agencies, penalties, per-
missible drugs, betting and the model steroid rule.11 Section III
proposes three different remedies to effectuate uniformity in imple-
menting a steroid regulation and deterring drug use generally. 12
Section IV concludes that the optimal solution requires the estab-
lishment of a national horseracing organization comprised of state
agencies as members.' 3
II. BACKGROUND
Horseracing's permissive stance on gambling is unique in the
sporting world. 14 While this distinction has created a reputation for
corruption, many people involved in horseracing have strived to
shake that unfavorable image of the industry.15 Nevertheless, many
owners and trainers view their racehorses as investments and will do
anything to get ahead in the sport, including administering per-
formance-enhancing drugs to their horses to gain a competitive ad-
vantage.1 6  Generally, people view the use of performance-
enhancing drugs as both animal abuse and cheating, and thus state
agencies ban the use of many drugs on horses and perform drug
mercurial nature of 1,200-pound investment vehicles running on legs more slen-
der than the average human's." Id. Worden also reflects on the typical investor
changing from middle class individuals to corporate entities. See id. Investors can
even look to NASDAQ and NYSE for stocks dedicated to owning, racing and breed-
ing horses. See id.
10. For a further discussion of the history of drugs in racing and a compari-
son of state regulations, see infra notes 14-85 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of how the different elements of racing interact,
see infra notes 14-85 and accompanying text.
12. For a further discussion of the constitutionality of agency regulation, see
infra notes 86-167 and accompanying text.
13. For a further discussion of how the options compare, see infra notes 168-
86 and accompanying text.
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 3002-13 (2008) (outlining parimutuel betting system in
horseracing).
15. SeeJoe Drape, At the Derby, Racing Takes on Its Drug Problem, N.Y. TIMES, May
12, 2005, at Al (comparing performance-enhancing drugs in horseracing to other
sports). In sports like cycling and baseball, drug use does not directly affect fans'
wallets. See id. In horseracing, however, people have bet billions of dollars on
their favorites. See id. The former executive director of KHRA, Jim Gallagher, com-
mented, "Now it's more important than ever we make people know that we are
doing everything in our power to protect the integrity of the game." Id.
16. See id. Dr. Scot Waterman, executive director of the Racing Medication
and Testing Consortium, said that only a "small percentage push [ ] the envelope"
and administer performance-enhancing drugs to their horses. Id.; see also Beyer,
supra note 9 (describing high costs and average low returns of owning racehorse).
3
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tests both before and after the races, even searching the stables for
drug paraphernalia. 17 Moreover, trainers are held absolutely liable
for any positive indication of drugs, though a horse that tests posi-
tive for performance-enhancing drugs after a race keeps its finish-
ing place due to the nature of the parimutuel betting system. 18
This Section will detail the history of agency regulation of hor-
seracing, including examining challenges to the agency scheme as a
whole and inquiring why trainers are held absolutely liable for
drugging their horses.19 Further, it will discuss the issue of sanc-
tions imposed for drug violations.20 The following section discusses
other permissible and impermissible drugs and their effects on rac-
ing.2' Additionally, this section explores the parimutuel betting sys-
tem and its effect on penalties, followed by the model steroid rule
proposed by the Racing Medication and Testing Consortium and
the Association of Racing Commissioners International. 22
A. Horseracing Agencies
Each state regulates its own horseracing industry through spe-
cialized agencies, 23 which in turn derive their power from that
state's legislature. 24 The various state horseracing agencies have a
17. See Drape, supra note 15 (describing procedures at Kentucky Derby). For
the first time in 2005, Derby winners were subject to a "super test," which tested for
hundreds of different substances. Id. Additionally, racing authorities tested the
horses before the race for alkalizing agents, often called milkshakes. See id. An-
other example includes when authorities found vials of cobra venom in Biancone's
stables. See McGee, supra note 2 (reporting Biancone's pending hearing).
18. See, e.g., MD. CODE REGS. 09.10.03.04(A) (1) (2007) (outlining procedure
for drug testing and sanctions). For a further discussion of parimutuel betting, see
infra notes 68-74.
19. For a further discussion of agencies regulating the horseracing industry,
see infra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of penalties for drug violations, see infra notes 38-
45 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of what drugs are administered to horses, see
infra notes 46-67 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of parimutuel betting and the model steroid rule,
see infra notes 68-85 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., 810 Ky. ADMIN. REcs. 1:002 (setting out power of stewards of
KHRA). "There really is no body of law dedicated exclusively to adjudicating dis-
putes relating to horses and horseracing." Worden, supra note 9, at 22 (providing
overview of equine law).
24. See Worden, supra note 9, at 22 (using California law as example of regula-
tion). Nonetheless Congress does have a hand in regulating the parimutuel bet-
ting scheme. See 15 U.S.C. § 3002-13 (2008) (defining parimutuel as "any system
whereby wagers with respect to the outcome of a horserace are placed with, or in, a
wagering pool conducted by a person licensed or otherwise permitted to do so
under State law, and in which the participants are wagering with each other and
not against the operator").
[Vol. 16: p. 199
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number of similar responsibilities. 25 They have the discretion to
license trainers and owners to race. 2 6 Furthermore, they can create
new rules through specific procedures and penalize those licensees
that do not comply with the agency's rules, as determined in an
administrative hearing. 27 Agencies can also resolve disputes among
licensees and employees. 28
State horseracing agencies wield vast power and, therefore,
many individuals have challenged the agencies' powers and their
procedures as unconstitutional. 29 Trainers have frequently brought
unsuccessful challenges under the nondelegation doctrine, claim-
ing that a state legislature unconstitutionally delegated its police
power to the state agency. 30 These challenges led to some contra-
dictory conclusions; for example, the agencies appear to possess
some police power, but they do not accord the same protections to
trainers as citizens receive from police.3' In another instance, a
25. See, e.g., 810 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 1:024 (setting out positions held and their
respective responsibilities). Under this section, the agency's commission is in
charge of licensing; appointing a supervisor over parimutuel betting; hiring a com-
mission veterinarian; maintaining a chemical laboratory for drug testing; making
new rules and hiring an investigator and conducting investigations, among other
responsibilities. See id.; accord 9 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 4200-4204
(2008) (establishing powers reserved). This section of New York's horseracing
agency statute permits the agency to issue licenses to amend and make new rules,
to punish violations, to appoint hearing officers and to resolve disputes. See id.
26. See, e.g., MD. CODE REGS. 09.10.01.25 (2008) (setting out licensing fees for
different participants in horseracing). A number of different people need licenses
in horseracing, including owners, trainers, jockeys, vendors, agents and other em-
ployees. See id.
27. See, e.g., 58 PA. CODE § 163.6 (2008) (mandating procedures for violations
of rules). Subsection (c) is rather broad in its discretionary power, stating, "The
stewards may fine, suspend or rule off a person who, in their opinion, has acted to
the detriment of racing or violated the rules." Id.
28. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 1424.350 (2008) (mandating proce-
dure of termination notice). If the termination is otherwise lawful, the Board may
resolve any continuing disputes regarding the employment. See id.
29. For a discussion of different constitutional challenges, see infra notes 29-
34 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Mcllmurray v. Mich. Racing Comm'r, 343 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1983) (holding that agency imposing fines on trainers for violating drug
policy was within scope of agency authority). The court interpreted the statute in
order to see what powers were specifically delegated to the agency. See id. at 526.
"[A] state agency has no inherent power, and ... any authority it has must come
from the Legislature." Id.
31. See McFarlin v. Florida, 405 So. 2d 255, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (not-
ing that state constitution prohibits agencies from issuing prison sentences). Thus,
the legislature could delegate other forms of punishment, such as fines and sus-
pension, but could not sentence violators of the statute to prison. See id. The facts
in one Pennsylvania case resemble a police interrogation, but the court held that
no Miranda warnings were necessary because the trainer was not a criminal defen-
dant. See Bocachica v. Pa. Horse Racing Comm'n, 843 A.2d 450, 453 (Pa. Commw.
5
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court reviewing the constitutionality of the Massachusetts horserac-
ing agency found that the agency constitutionally exercises the po-
lice power of the state, but a court reviewing the Illinois
horseracing agency held that a warrantless search of a jockey's care
was permissible.32 Others have challenged horseracing agencies'
procedures under the Due Process Clause, with modest success. 33
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has heard only one
Equal Protection claim, relating to length of suspension.34
Procedurally, stewards usually make the initial decisions in
these cases.3 5 If that decision is disputed, and the stewards decision
is not binding under state regulation, the affected party can appeal
to the Board or Commission.3 6 If the party is still dissatisfied, he or
she can appeal to the state or federal appeals court, depending on
the issue on appeal.3 7
B. Penalties
When a state agency detects banned drugs in a horse's system,
the degree of penalty will differ depending on the state. 38 The
form of the penalties is usually the same - returning the purse,
fines and suspension - but the degree of punishment can vary
Ct. 2004) (holding appellant's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated when
horseracing authorities interrogated him).
32. See LeRoy v. Ill. Racing Bd., 39 F.3d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
warrantless search of jockey's care by agency authority did not violate constitu-
tional protection against unreasonable search and seizure); Fiorvanti v. Mass. Rac-
ing Comm'n, 375 N.E.2d 722, 726 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (noting that agency
exercises form of police power over horseracing).
33. See Edelberg v. Ill. Racing Bd., 540 F.2d 279, 287 (7th Cir. 1976) (af-
firming dismissal of owners' suit claiming violation of due process). The owners
wanted a hearing when the Board withheld and redistributed the purse money of a
winning horse after it tested positive for banned drugs. See id. at 281; see also Hud-
son v. Tex. Racing Comm'n, 455 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 2006) (upholding statu-
tory scheme of absolute trainer liability); Jackson v. Ark. Racing Comm'n, 34
S.W.3d 740, 743 (Ark. 2001) (holding sanctions could be imposed on owner with-
out proving collusion between owner and jockey using banned electrical device on
horse); Hickey v. Riera, 774 N.E.2d 1, 14 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (dismissing due pro-
cess challenge that statute was vague); Hartman v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 800 A.2d
279, 285 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (reversing sanction against owners after
trainer raced horse despite suspension).
34. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66 (1979) (holding indefinite suspension
from racing without hearing is unconstitutional).
35. See McGee, supra note 2 (discussing legal path of Biancone's case).
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Heller, supra note 1 (arguing for national regulation of drugs in
horseracing).
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greatly across states.39 For instance, in Kentucky a trainer may be
suspended for a second drug offense for three to five years,40 but in
Maryland a trainer is only subject to a judge's or steward's discre-
tion, with no guidelines whatsoever.
41
Furthermore, some states may uphold a trainer's suspension in
another state, but many states choose to permit trainers to race
even if they are suspended by another state's agency, removing in-
centive to adhere to the drug guidelines. 42 Additionally, trainers
are held absolutely liable when their horses test positive for banned
performance-enhancing drugs. 43 Some states penalize the veterina-
rian who prescribed the drug.44 Nonetheless, states like Kentucky
declare that agency sanctions do not preclude licensees from pun-
ishment under the state's criminal code.
45
39. See, e.g., MD. CODE REGS. 09.10.03.04, §§ E, G (2007) (listing possible sanc-
tions). In Maryland, sanctions include disqualification of the horse, license sus-
pension and "denial, forfeiture, and prompt return of a purse, sweepstakes,
trophy, or any other reward received by the owner of a horse found to have carried
a drug in its body during a race." Id.
40. See 810 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 1:028, § 4(1) (b) (2007) (describing penalties for
second violation with Class A drug). Kentucky leaves the trainers the power to
negotiate with KHRA, however, by allowing the payment of fines and forfeiture of
purse money to reduce the suspension time. See id.
41. See MD. CODE REGS. 09.10.03.04, § G (2007) (listing potential sanctions
judges and stewards "may" order). Maryland further amplifies ajudge's discretion
to include repeat offenders. See id. § H.
42. See Leading Horse Trainers, supra note 3 (noting that trainer Scot Lake was
suspended in New York while serving suspension in Delaware). But see MD. CODE
REGS. 09.10.03.04(H) (2007) (noting "an individual guilty of violating this regula-
tion, or a comparable regulation of another racing jurisdiction, for the second
time is considered a repeat offender"). Racing in other states is not the only miss-
ing deterrent - Biancone, suspended by KHRA for vials of cobra venom found in
his stables, was permitted to collect prize money from the championships. See
Trainer Barred, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2007, at D4 (detailing trainer Patrick Bian-
cone's suspension).
43. See, e.g., MD. CODE REGS. 09.10.03.04(F) (2007) ("[A] trainer is the abso-
lute insurer of, and responsible for, the condition of each horse the trainer enters
into a race, regardless of the acts of third parties"); see also Joe Drape, Suspension
Sends Message at Breeders' Cup, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, at D1 (reporting on trainer
Patrick Biancone's suspension). Even a polygraph test and vehement denials
could not save Biancone from a one-year suspension by KHRA after vials of cobra
venom were found in his stable. See id.
44. See, e.g., 810 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 1:028, § 2(4) (2007) (listing licenses that
may be suspended for violations). KHRA has the authority to suspend licenses of
owners, trainers and veterinarians. See id.
45. See810 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 1:028, § 2(10) (2007) (noting that administrative
sanction does not preclude criminal prosecution). "An administrative action or
the imposition of penalties pursuant to this administrative regulation shall not con-
stitute a bar or be considered jeopardy to prosecution of an act that violates the
criminal statutes of Kentucky." Id.
205
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C. Permissible and Impermissible Drugs
Not all drugs are banned from horseracing. 46 Many different
drugs have therapeutic qualities that will not affect the perform-
ance of the horse.47 Some of these drugs are classified as non-ster-
oid anti-inflammatory drugs ("NSAIDs").48 The two most widely
used and popularly known permissible drugs are furosemide, better
known as Lasix, and phenylbutazone, an NSAID commonly known
as Bute. 49
Lasix is administered to a horse that has excessive bleeding in
its lungs. 50 This bleeding, a condition known as exercise-induced
pulmonary hemorrhage, is caused by the horse's inner organs be-
coming out of rhythm with the rest of the body. 51 While running,
the horse's intestines slam against its diaphragm and lungs, causing
the lungs to bleed.52 Because it prevents such bleeding in the
lungs, Lasix is arguably a performance-enhancing drug.53 To help
counteract the argument that Lasix enhances performance, racing
clubs tell bettors on the program whether a horse is on Lasix and
how many races the horse has run on Lasix. 54 Further complicating
46. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 260-70-650 (2007) (describing permitted
uses of furosemide). Furosemide is better known as Lasix. See Dr. Joseph C.
O'Dea, A Trail of Blood, THOROUGHBRED TIMES, Apr. 11, 1995, http://
www.thoroughbredtimes.com/horse-health/1995/April/11/A-trail-of-blood-
.aspx (describing effects of Lasix on horses). Under Washington's statute, trainers
and veterinarians can administer Lasix to the horses prior to a race if the horse is
placed on the official bleeder list. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 260-70-650 (2007).
The limitations, however, include that Lasix must be administered intravenously
and under 500 mg. See id. Furthermore, the trainer must file a particular form
with the official veterinarian that includes the horse's number, the dosage, the
signature of the veterinarian who administered the drug and the signature of the
trainer. See id. Otherwise, the horse will be scratched from the race. See id.
47. See, e.g., 810 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 1:018 (2007) (regulating medications and
testing procedures in horseracing).
48. See id. at 1:018(4) (permitting NSAIDs phenylbutazone, flunixin and
ketoprofen). These drugs, however, are only permitted at a certain concentration
on race day. See id.
49. See id. (noting two most common NSAIDs).
50. See O'Dea, supra note 46 (describing in detail effects of Lasix on horses).
51. See id. (explaining why horses' lungs bleed during strenuous exercise).
The natural rhythm of breathing is tied to the horse's stride: inhalation occurs
when the front feet hit the ground, and exhalation occurs when the front feet
leave the ground. See id.
52. See id. Another way to prevent bleeding is keeping the horse from eating
hay six to twelve hours prior to racing. See id.
53. See id. (discussing Lasix's effectiveness).
54. See Heller, supra note 1 (identifying effect on bettors when positive drug
results are hidden). Thus, a handicapper may see a horse with a losing record that
is running on Lasix for the first time and decide that the horse is a good bet; the
bleeding may have been preventing the horse from running at its full potential.
See id. Racetracks, however, did not always require this disclosure. See id.
8
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the controversial use of Lasix is the fact that the drug also functions
as a diuretic and thus could be used to flush out evidence of other
drugs in the horse's system.
55
Alternatively, Bute is an anti-inflammatory drug that does not
affect a horse's performance beyond relieving its pain.56 Bute is
extremely common, but long-term usage could lead to ulcers,
which can result in a loss of appetite and weight, as well as gastroin-
testinal bleeding.
57
While Lasix and Bute are permissible in horseracing, hundreds
of other drugs are not.5 8 The Racing Commissioners International
Uniform Classification of Foreign Substances classifies drugs ac-
cording to their potential to influence the horse's performance.
59
The KHRA drug schedule, often considered the most permissive
for drug use, classifies nearly four hundred drugs as Class A.60 Class
A drugs are defined as "those that have no legitimate therapeutic
[value] and have not been approved for use in the horse [by] the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration .... Their potential to influ-
ence performance is high. ."...61 Such drugs include chloroform,
cocaine, codeine, diamorphine (heroin), lithium, morphine and
snake venoms. 62 Other drugs are further broken down into B, C
and D classes, all of which carry different penalties when found in a
55. See Brent Kelly, Veterinary Topics: Track Work Can Be Frustrating, THOROUGH-
BRED TIMES, Aug. 26, 2005, http://www.thoroughbredtimes.com/horse-health/
2005/August/26/Veterinary-Topics-Track-work-can-be-frustrating.aspx (discussing
experience with trainers requesting medications before races). Interestingly, Kelly
recalls an incident where the trainer requested a cocktail of drugs: Lasix, Bute, and
even steroids. See id.
56. See id. (describing effects of Lasix and Bute). Kelly also points out that
many banned drugs will not show up on drug tests. See id. Eventually, Kelly de-
cided to stop working at racetracks because, among other reasons, he cared more
about healing horses than about getting a horse through "one more race." See id.
57. See Mike Jones, Emerald Break Downs, PAWS MAGAZINE, Issue 40, 1999, avail-
able at http://www.paws.org/about/mag/issues/issue40/omak.php (describing
different drugs administered to racehorses). An overdose of Bute can lead to kid-
ney failure and death. See id.
58. See generally Kentucky Horse Racing Authority Uniform Drug and Medica-
tion Classification Schedule, available at http://www.khra.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/
Al 8DAEB7-6685-49F7-AC58-B60EA2559E 13/0/KHRADrugandMedicationClassifi-
cationSchedulell05.pdf, last visited Oct. 23, 2008 [hereinafter Kentucky Horse
Racing Authority Uniform Drug and Medication Classification Schedule] (listing
classifications of hundreds of drugs).
59. See id. (listing drugs in different classes according to potential to alter
horse's performance and therapeutic effect on horse).
60. See id. (listing Class A drugs).
61. Id. (defining Class A drugs).
62. See id. (setting out hundreds of drugs under Class A).
9
Gasparon: The Dark Horse of Drug Abuse: Legal Issues of Administering Perfo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009
208 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
horse's system. 63 Interestingly, the four most commonly used ster-
oids - boldenone, stanozolol, nandrolone and testosterone - are
not classified and thus not prohibited.64
While many drugs are banned, relatively few tests exist to test
the horses for those drugs. 65 As a result, trainers may have little
incentive to keep their horses free from performance-enhancing
drugs when they know they cannot and will not be caught.66 Con-
versely, the tests that do exist are unreliable and frequently result in
false positives that unnecessarily penalize innocent trainers and
owners.
67
63. See id. (listing different classifications of hundreds of drugs). Class B
drugs are defined as "those that may have a legitimate therapeutic indication in
the equine athlete but also have a high potential to influence performance." Id.
Class C drugs are defined as having therapeutic value to the horse and a low poten-
tial to affect its performance. See id. Class D drugs are therapeutic drugs that have
restricted concentration limits. See id.; see also 810 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 1:028 (2007)
(setting out penalties according to drug violation).
64. See Kentucky Horse Racing Authority Uniform Drug and Medication Clas-
sification Schedule, supra note 58 (classifying drugs). As the statute currently
stands, KHRA permits use of any steroid because none are classified on the drug
schedule. See id.; see also Leslie Deckard, Kentucky Moves to Regulate Racehorse Steroids,
THE HORSE, Dec. 18, 2007, http://www.thehorse.com/ViewArticle.aspx?ID=1100
3&nID=17 (reporting KHRA's support for regulating anabolic steroids). The
model rule does not propose a complete prohibition, but rather a limitation of the
four steroids mentioned, but the horse must still stay below certain urine concen-
tration levels. See id.
65. See Heller, supra note 1 (discussing effect of illegal drug use on bettors).
Heller uses the Class B drug epogen as his example. See id. The "breakthrough"
test for epogen only tests for anti-bodies, which may naturally be in the horse's
system or linger far beyond the drug use, up to 120 days. See id.
66. See id. (describing events after horses test positive for epogen). Because
the test was new, and many states did not use it, trainers could get away with ad-
ministering the drug as they could not be caught through a blood or urine test of
the horse. See id. Furthermore, when horses were testing positive for epogen, the
names of the horses and their trainers were not published. See id. Heller analo-
gizes the unpublished use of epogen to the early use of Lasix, which only recently
started appearing on racing programs. See id. An alternative theory as to why posi-
tive drugs tests do not come to light is the perception that the horseracing industry
is declining. See Handle Numbers Fall in Maryland in 2007, THOROUGHBRED TIMES,
Jan. 3, 2008, http://www.thoroughbredtimes.com/racing-news/2008/January/
03/Handle-numbers-fall-in-Maryland-in-2007.aspx (reporting annual average de-
crease in Maryland as 6.5%); see also Paul Post, NYC OTB Could Close in June, THOR-
OUGHBRED TIMES, Jan. 23, 2008, http://www.thoroughbredtimes.com/national-
news/2008/January/23/NYC-OTB-could-close-in-June.aspx (reporting lack of
state funding as part of New York City Off-Track Betting's impending failure).
Should New York City Off-Track Betting shut down, New York State Breeders and
Development Fund would miss 42% of its revenues for awards. See id.
67. See Heller, supra note 1 (describing how epogen is produced naturally in
horses and can linger in horse's system for up to 120 days); see also Worden, supra
note 9, at 25 (describing drug testing as "hot area of equine law"). According to
Worden, the only defense to a positive drug test is to prove that the test was wrong.
See id. For example, a positive drug test could easily be the result of the horse
grazing among poppies. See id. Not only is the purse money forfeited, but the
(Vol. 16: p. 199
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D. Parimutuel Betting
The system for gambling on horseracing is called parimutuel.
68
The system is designed to reduce corruption by determining a pay-
out based on how much money was bet on each horse, thus forcing
gamblers to bet against each other.69 The stakes fluctuate and are
re-calculated with each new bet until the race begins.70 Thus, a par-
ticular horse's odds reduce as more money is placed on it, but the
odds of every other horse in that same race increase.
71
trainer's reputation is damaged as well, and the owners want good answers as to
why their winning investment is suddenly lost. See id.
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 3002(13) (2008) (defining parimutuel as "any system
whereby wagers with respect to the outcome of a horserace are placed with, or in, a
wagering pool conducted by a person licensed or otherwise permitted to do so
under State law, and in which the participants are wagering with each other and
not against the operator"). Congress issued this regulation through its power
under the Commerce Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
69. See 15 U.S.C. § 3002(13) (describing parimutuel betting).
70. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 300.10 (2008) (prohibiting betting af-
ter race starts).
71. See Groetzinger v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 82 T.C. 793 n.24 (com-
paring parimutuel betting on dogs with investing in stock exchange).
The parimutuel system in effect performs the same function as the stock
exchange in coordinating the transactions of these independent bettors.
By placing a bet, the gambler is simultaneously "purchasing" a chance on
one dog, and "selling" to another bettor a chance on the other dogs. The
"price" of these various chances is reflected by the constantly changing
"odds" on the different dogs, which is simply a method of expressing, in
quantitative terms, the aggregate preferences of the pool of bettors. In
this sense, the "odds board" at the track plays the role of the ticker tape
on the floor of the stock exchange.
Id. While the system is effective in reducing corruption when implemented cor-
rectly, problems arise when "glitches" permit gamblers to bet on a horse after the
race has already started. See Ed Martin, Commentary: Past Posting, BLOOD HORSE,
Jan. 8, 2008, http://opinions.bloodhorse.com/viewstory.asp?id= 4 3028 (describing
gambler who admitting to wagering after race began on multiple occasions). Ap-
parently, betting pools are not entirely secure; evidence shows multiple states have
issues with bettors placing wagers after the race begins, including Louisiana, Ken-
tucky, New York and Texas. See id. This simplistic overview may give the impres-
sion that the parimutuel betting system is easy, but betting on horses can be as
complicated as the gambler chooses to make it; for instance, the simpler types of
bets a person may lay down include: to win, to place or to show, which only re-
quires the bettor to pick one horse and place money on whether the horse will
come in first, second or third. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 301.20 (2008) (defin-
ing win); id. § 301.30 (defining place); id. § 301.40 (defining show). Alternatively,
the bettor may wish to place an exacta, trifecta or superfecta, all of which require
the bettor to pick multiple horses that will finish in the specific order the bettor
chooses. See id. § 305.10 (defining perfecta/exacta betting); id. § 306.10 (defining
trifecta betting); id. § 311.10 (defining superfecta betting). Further complicating
matters, a bettor may choose a quinella or box, which permits the bettor to choose
multiple horses to finish in any order. See id. § 304.10 (defining quinella betting).
Furthermore, if the bettor is spending the day at the track, the bettor may choose
to place a double, triple or sweep bet, which is betting on the winners of two, three
or four (or more) successive races, respectively. See id. § 303.10 (defining "Daily
209
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The parimutuel betting system makes gamblers bet against
each other, and because of the potential for bets to last several
races, disqualifying a horse after it has raced could pose serious
problems to the system and leave gamblers out of both luck and
money. 72 Thus, when a horse is disqualified after a race, the bet-
ting remains unaffected, and the horse may keep its place in terms
of pay-outs. 73 The remaining penalties, then, are withholding
purse money, fining the necessary parties and suspending those lia-
ble for the infraction - all penalties that focus on punishing the
horse's owners, trainers and veterinarians.74
E. Model Steroid Rule
Iowa was the first state to ban steroids in horseracing in 2007. 75
Thus, many trainers used anabolic steroids to enhance the perform-
ance of their horses in racing. 76 The horseracing industry, how-
ever, is increasingly concerned with public perception of the use of
steroids in racing. 77 Many states are taking steps to ban steroids,
Double" bets); id. § 308.90 (defining "'Pick 3 Pools"); id. § 308.10 (defining "Pick"
betting choosing first-place finisher in designated number of races). Illinois per-
mits many other ways to bet, such as the "supertrifecta," which "requires selection
of the first three finishers, in their exact order, in the first of two designated con-
tests and the first four finishers, in exact order, in the second of two designated
contests." Id. § 309.10.
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 3002(13) (2008) (defining parimutuel betting).
73. See generally ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 300 (2008) (omitting penalties on
bettors). When a horse is "scratched" before a race or does not otherwise start,
however, the wagers are refunded. See id. § 300.70.
74. See 810 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 1:028 § 4 (2007) (establishing potential penalties
for positive drug test depending on class of drug and previous violations). KHRA
has the authority to negotiate with the trainer, however, on the final penalty. See
id. For instance, KHRA has the discretion to determine a trainer's suspension, and
the trainer may offer to pay a larger fine or forfeit purse money won in return for a
shorter suspension. See id.
75. See Bill Finley, Horse Racing Officials Move Toward Steroid Ban, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 2007, at D1 (reporting horseracing authorities' interest in steroid
regulation).
76. See id. (noting that steroid use was not illegal, but rather part of competi-
tion). In fact, every other country with horseracing bans steroids. See Matt Hegarty,
Medication and Testing Panel Sets Steroids Timeline, ESPN.coM, Feb. 1, 2008, http://
sports.espn.go.com/sports/horse/news/story?id=3225880 (noting lack of uniform
regulation of steroids in U.S. horseracing). Other countries' bans on steroids,
however, maybe due to their eating habits. SeeVicki Mabrey, Horse Slaughter Indus-
try May Be on Its Last Legs: Congress to Consider Outlawing Practice of Killing Horses for
Meat, ABC NEWS, Sept. 6, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=2396
197&page=l (reporting that many horses slaughtered in U.S. are shipped to Eu-
rope and Asia for human consumption). "The anti-horse slaughter movement was
galvanized when the 1986 Kentucky Derby winner, Ferdinand, was killed and eaten
in Japan." Id.
77. See Finley, supra note 75 (summarizing overall impression of drugs in
sports). The medical director for the California Horse Racing Board, Dr. Rick
12
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but the lack of uniformity between different agencies makes a blan-
ket ban on these drugs difficult. 78
As it stands, the model statute developed by the Racing Medi-
cation and Testing Consortium ("RMTC") and the Association of
Racing Commissioners International ("ARCI") will ban all but four
anabolic steroids: stanozolol, boldenone, nandrolone and testoster-
one.79 These four drugs, however, must still be under a certain
threshold concentration limit in the horse's blood or urine.80 The
problem with testing for these steroids, though, is that three out of
the four naturally occur in a horse's system.81 Thus, finding a logi-
cal threshold level, an efficient test and a reasonable number of
days before a race when the drugs may be administered, are far
more daunting tasks than many realize.8 2
Furthermore, RMTC is pushing for uniform regulations across
states.83 Much of the pressure for national standards on steroid use
Arthur, said, "We want a sport where what you see is what you get .... I think
that's what the public wants. People say steroids don't make horses run faster. I'm
not convinced . . . and I don't think the public is convinced . . . ." Id.
78. See Tom LaMarra, Racing Group Endorses Deadline for Steroid Rule Adoption,
THE HORSE, Feb. 1, 2008, http://www.thehorse.com/ViewArticle.aspx?ID=l 1253
[hereinafter LaMarra, Racing Group Endorses Deadline] (noting Delaware, Indiana
and Pennsylvania will begin testing in late winter or early spring). Part of the prob-
lem with staggered implementation of steroid bans across states is that horses regu-
larly travel between states to race. See id. Thus, a trainer may be penalized in one
state but not in another for acting in the exact same manner. See id.; see also
Hegarty, supra note 76 (reporting desire forJan. 1, 2009 implementation of steroid
regulations).
79. See LaMarra, Racing Group Endorses Deadline, supra note 78 (reporting types
of steroids permitted in model rule). The Federal Drug Administration has ap-
proved the use of all four steroids. See id.
80. See id. (observing RMTC's funding of research to better provide realistic
threshold levels).
81. See id. (noting which steroids naturally occur in horses). "Nandrolone
and boldenone are naturally occurring in intact males, and testosterone is natu-
rally occurring in all horses." Id.
82. See Tom LaMarra, Model Rule on Steroid Use Blasted, THE HORSE, Jan. 26,
2008, http://www.thehorse.com/ViewArticle.aspx?ID=11223 (reporting view that
model rule provides arbitrary link between threshold levels and withdrawal times).
Some critics are more vociferous about their opinions, such as Dr. Steven Barker, a
chemist for the Louisiana Racing Commission, who said, "The model rule as
drafted is an embarrassment .... The group that put this together should be
taken out and beaten. What we've heard is an awful lot of misinformation and
mythology." Id.
83. See LaMarra, Racing Group Endorses Deadline, supra note 78 (noting RMTC's
wish for uniform adoption of rule across states). Lamarra reports:
The RMTC and RCI recommend a $500 fine and disqualification of the
horse for the first violation; a $1,000 fine, disqualification, and a 15-day
trainer suspension for the second violation in a 365-day period; and a
$2,500 fine, disqualification, and 30-day trainer suspension for the third
violation in a 365-day period.
13
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in horseracing is due to the Congressional hearings on steroids in
Major League Baseball. 84 Fearing a blanket ban, horseracing offi-
cials from the National Thoroughbred Racing Association
("NTRA") have approached Congress with a model rule in hopes of
staving off federal interference.
85
III. ANALYsis
Horseracing's self-regulating state agencies, the nature of the
parimutuel betting system and discretionary penalties combine to
create a troubling setting for drug regulation.86 The solution to
this increasingly urgent problem, however, need not be equally
complex.87 This article proposes three options to regulate and de-
ter the use of performance-enhancing drugs in horseracing on a
national scale. 88 The first potential solution, which is based on
each state's resistance to national regulations, is to impose heftier
penalties with sanction guidelines for the agencies, as well as sub-
jecting violators to criminal prosecution.8 9 The second proposed
solution, a compromise between keeping state independence and
adhering to a national standard, is to create a national organization
analogous to that of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
("NCAA").9° The third possible solution, and the solution that the
horseracing industry fears most, is to leave regulation entirely to
Congress.91
84. See id. (reporting on increased publicity of steroids in professional sports).
85. See id. President and chief executive officer of the NTRA, Alex Waldrop,
thinks self-regulation is the answer to the steroids issue. He stated, "[g]iven the
scrutiny of anabolic steroids by the media and Congress, and the consequential
negative perception of these drugs by the public, the horse racing industry must
take initiative on its own volition to properly and uniformly regulate the use of
anabolic steroids in racehorses this year." Id.
86. For a further discussion of the complex problems associated with drugs in
horseracing, see supra notes 13-83 and accompanying text.
87. For a further discussion of different legal problems, see supra notes 14-82
and accompanying text.
88. For a further discussion of different legal solutions, see infra notes 92-167
and accompanying text.
89. For a further discussion of potential penalties to deter the use of perform-
ance-enhancing drugs without going to a national standard, see infra notes 92-122
and accompanying text.
90. For a further discussion of potentially creating a national organization
with authority to oversee horseracing, see infra notes 123-50 and accompanying
text.
91. For a further discussion of leaving regulation of performance-enhancing
drugs in horseracing to Congress, see infra notes 151-167 and accompanying text.
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A. Guidelines and Criminal Sanctions
As noted above, state agencies vary on the severity of penalties
levied for horse doping.92 Furthermore, horseracing agencies tend
to have a considerable amount of discretion in implementing their
statutes. 93 When added to the fact that some states do not recog-
nize other states' suspensions, trainers often have little incentive to
follow the rules.94 Additionally, there are other factors that miti-
gate deterrence. For instance, the trainers may still collect prize
money.95 Or, more cynically, the trainers are only a phone call
away from administering advice to the new trainer, making the sus-
pension completely useless because of the difficulties of enforcing
it.96
On the other hand, a trainer's absolute liability under state
statutes is relatively harsh.9 7 As the absolute insurer, the trainer is
theoretically vulnerable to corruption and abuse.98 Stables are gen-
erally well-guarded at the Triple Crown races - Preakness Stakes,
Kentucky Derby and Belmont Stakes - where the most thorough
drug tests are administered, but it only takes one empty vial to
make a trainer liable for impermissible drugs; if drugs are found in
the stables, it can create the presumption that the horse raced with
the drug in its system. 99 Under this standard, the horseracing in-
dustry is concerned about combating the prevalence of steroids by
imposing increasingly harsher penalties on violators - such as Pat-
92. See Heller, supra note 1 (arguing for national regulations of drugs in
horseracing).
93. See MD. CODE REGS. 09.10.03.04, §§ E, G (2007) (permitting agency discre-
tion to determine appropriate sanction).
94. See Leading Horse Trainers, supra note 3 (listing several trainers with no or
relatively light sanctions after violating drug regulations).
95. See Trainer Barred, supra note 2 (noting terms of Biancone's suspension
include potential to continue collecting prize money).
96. See Press Release, California Horse Racing Board, Committee Takes Hard
Line on Drugs, Penalties, (Jan. 11, 2007), available at http://www.chrb.ca.gov/
press releases/2007-01-1 Il-press-release.pdf (reporting tightened controls on an-
abolic steroids and clenbutrol in California). CHRB Chairman Richard B. Shapiro
said, "[w] e cannot simply allow a suspended trainer to train over the phone.... A
suspension must have meat on the bone and be truly punitive and costly to anyone
receiving one." Id.
97. See, e.g., MD. CODE REGs. 09.10.03.04, § F (2007) (holding trainer as "abso-
lute insurer of, and responsible for, the condition of each horse the trainer enters
in a race").
98. See id. (holding trainer absolutely liable "regardless of the acts of third
parties").
99. See McGee, Cobra Venom, supra note 2 (reporting Biancone's suspension
for vials of cobra venom in stables). While Biancone's horses tested positive for
derivatives of caffeine and an inhalant, both banned by KHRA, the focus of his
suspension was the cobra venom in his stables. See id.
15
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rick Biancone - with the hope of discouraging other potential
violators. 100
Despite this liability, and because of the enormous pressures
trainers face, the risks inherent in using impermissible drugs may
outweigh the risk of getting caught and receiving a sanction. 0 1
Most notably, a sanction is not guaranteed; the horse must first fail
a drug test, and often the trainer can argue that the drug was natu-
rally in the horse's system or that the test result was incorrect.
10 2
Overriding the deterrence, however, is the unbelievable pressure
trainers sustain by controlling owners' extraordinary invest-
ments.103 Moreover, trainers face stiff competition, and the average
pay-out is very low. 10 4 Therefore, if trainers wish to keep their jobs
secure, they will do everything within their power to make their
horses winners. 105
Another possible preclusion to effective deterrence could be
that agencies feel pressured to remain lax on trainers so that hor-
seracing can stay alive in its currently declining situation. 10 6 State
agencies enjoy their power and wish to regulate their own indus-
100. See Drape, Suspension Sends Message, supra note 43 (explaining reasoning
behind Biancone's suspension). Discussing the extensive preventative measures
utilized by the industry to combat prohibited drug use, President of the Breeders'
Cup Limited, Greg Avioli, stated, "Part of this is to shock and awe the cheaters ....
When they see the level of security and how serious we are about deterring illegal
medications, we believe there will be a prophylactic effect." Id.
101. See Beyer, supra note 9 (reflecting on costs of investing in racehorses); see
also Leading Horse Trainers, supra note 3 (noting several trainers suspended for drug
violations). Trainers have traditionally faced light penalties for drug violations,
such as Rick Dutrow, who was suspended for only sixty days for two drug violations.
See id. Another example is Bobby Frankel, whose morphine violation was pending
for six years before it was dropped without penalty. See id.
102. See Worden, supra note 9 (describing common issues in litigating equine
law). "The only real defense is to show that the test was wrong and that the con-
trolled substance was actually not there." Id. Thus, when a horse fails just one test
of hundreds administered after a race, the purse is forfeited and often leads to
litigation. See id.
103. See id. (noting owners' frustration when their horses test positive for ille-
gal substances); see also Beyer, supra note 9 (noting that racehorses may sell for
over one million dollars, with average upkeep costing between $30,000 to
$50,000).
104. See Beyer, supra note 9 (comparing investments and actual earnings of
average racehorse). The average earnings for an American racehorse are about
$16,000, when upkeep alone averages twice that amount. See id.
105. See Worden, supra note 9 (commenting on owners' impatience when
purse money is forfeited from positive drug tests). Worden ominously writes,
"[T]he owner who is forced to give back the purse ...generally demands an
explanation from his or her trainers, and sometimes demands more." Id.
106. See Handle Numbers Fall in Maryland in 2007, supra note 66 (reporting
decrease of six and one half percent); see also Post, supra note 66 (noting lack of
state funding as part of New York City Off-Track Betting's impending failure).
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tries independently, as is evidenced by their quick lobbying of Con-
gress to allow the horseracing industry to regulate its own steroids
without federal interference. 10 7 Nevertheless, if state agencies wish
to continue self-regulating, they must enhance and enforce their
policies on drug use. 10 8
This can only be accomplished if the industry institutes one of
several different reforms. First, states need to reign in agency dis-
cretion in administering sanctions. 10 9 Kentucky's KHRA statute is a
useful model for these reforms because it outlines specific limits to
the penalties, including minimum suspensions and fines. 110 The
problem with the KHRA statute, though, is that the agency may still
negotiate with the trainer to reduce the suspension by increasing
the trainer's fines.1 11 This broad discretion essentially allows train-
ers to buy themselves out of a suspension. 112
As a result, agency discretion and potential for trainer negotia-
tions do not effectively ensure enforcement of the regulations, but
a guideline setting concrete minimum and maximum penalties for
different violations could serve as a potent deterrent for trainers
considering drugs to enhance their horses' performance.1 3 States
would also have to respect and uphold one another's sanctions in
order to make the punishment effective." 14
Setting guidelines alone, however, may be too harsh when
horse trainers face absolute liability and when current drug tests
often show false positives. 15 Such a problem could be overcome if
107. See LaMarra, Racing Officials, supra note 4 (reporting on industry officials
meeting with Congressmen).
108. For a further discussion of different state regulations on performance-
enhancing drugs, see supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., MD. CODE REGS. 09.10.03.04, § G (2007) (outlining penalties
agency "may" implement, starting at nothing).
110. See generally 810 Ky. ADMIN. REGs. 1:028 (2007) (outlining in great detail
maximum and minimum penalties depending on severity of violation).
111. See id. § 4(1) (a) (2) (permitting agency to reduce suspension if licensee
pays fine or forfeits purse money).
112. See id. Purse money is not automatically forfeited in this section but may
be offered as a way to reduce suspension. See id.
113. For a further discussion of incentives to use performance-enhancing
drugs, see supra note 9 and accompanying text. See also LaMarra, Model Rule on
Steroid Use Blasted, supra note 82 (describing need for uniform penalties and thresh-
olds for steroid use).
114. See Leading Horse Trainers, supra note 3 (noting trainer suspended in New
York while already suspended in Delaware).
115. See, e.g., MD. CODE REGS. 09.10.03.04, (F) (2007) (holding trainer as "ab-
solute insurer of, and responsible for, the condition of each horse the trainer en-
ters into a race, regardless of the acts of third parties."); see LaMarra, Racing Group
Endorses Deadline, supra note 78 (noting three out of four anabolic steroids occur
naturally in horses).
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the industry reduced the trainers' liability to strict liability, because
this would afford a trainer some defenses in order to escape sanc-
tions altogether when the trainer has evidence of his innocence.
1 16
Another option that may stand alone or in addition to those
proposed is subjecting trainers to criminal prosecution more
often.1 17 Because the agency penalties are considered civil, trainers
are still theoretically vulnerable to criminal penalties after facing
agency sanctions.' 18 If agency statutes compelled judges to turn
over egregious violations that would constitute animal abuse, per-
haps trainers would be less likely to dabble in prohibited drugs in
order to avoid a criminal record.119
These possibilities for reform in drug regulation are not opti-
mal, however, because without national standards a trainer may es-
cape sanctions in a state with less stringent standards but get
penalized the next week for administering to his horse in exactly
the same way. 120 This is not an effective regulation of drugs, and it
may only serve to keep trainers from traveling to states with stricter
drug policies.1 21 Without the adoption of a national standard or
authority, however, specific penalty guidelines and harsher sanc-
tions remain the best solution for reducing performance-enhancing
drugs in the horseracing industry.122
B. Creating a National Authority
Harsher penalty enforcement by each state does not solve the
problem of uniformity among states, therefore a national organiza-
tion directly in charge of all drug regulation provides the best rem-
edy to ensure that states do not have varying degrees of penalties
116. See LaMarra, Racing Group Endorses Deadline, supra note 78 (noting three
out of four anabolic steroids occur naturally in horses); see also Worden, supra note
9 (noting horses grazing in poppies may test positive for morphine). Worden also
stated that proving a test incorrect is a trainer's only defense to a positive drug test.
See id.
117. See810 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 1:028(2) (10) (2007) (noting that administrative
sanction does not preclude criminal prosecution).
118. See id.
119. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5511 (2007) (criminalizing intentional
animal cruelty).
120. See LaMarra, Racing Group Endorses Deadline, supra note 78 (noting train-
ers' fear that staggered implementation of steroid ban may result in inconsistent
penalties).
121. See id. (discussing effect of differing drug regulations across states).
122. For a further discussion of the benefits of national standards, see infra
notes 123-50 and accompanying text.
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for the same offense.1 23 A national organization overseeing horser-
acing could provide more than just uniform implementation of
drug regulations. 24 The organization could also create a national
horseracing license, thereby enforcing penalties nationally. 125 Fur-
thermore, the new organization could unify various persuasive or-
ganizations that specialize in particular interests, including a
committee dedicated to developing more accurate drug testing pro-
cedures, withdrawal times and publication issues.126 Finally, a na-
tional organization could mitigate pressure on agencies from
entities with competing interests. 127
While some may consider the National Football League or Na-
tional Basketball Association as primary examples in national regu-
lation of sports, the NCAA may provide a better model. 28 The
NCAA is an unincorporated organization composed of nearly 1,000
voluntary members, which are four-year college institutions with
competitive athletic programs. 129 The NCAA has a central author-
ity in the Management Council, which can create committees dedi-
cated to specific programs. 130 Moreover, the organization has
legislation that applies to all schools in a variety of different mat-
ters, such as eligibility, recruiting, transfers and admissions. 3 1 A
committee separate from the Management Council enforces the
legislation.132
An easy way to entice states to participate in a national horser-
acing program is the promise of representation, which the NCAA
model offers by according voting authority to representatives of its
member institutions. 33 In its democratic design, an initial propo-
sal to adopt or amend NCAA bylaws first passes through the Man-
123. For a further discussion of possible remedies besides creating a national
horseracing organization, see supra notes 92-122 and accompanying text; see also
infra notes 151-67 and accompanying text.
124. See Heller, supra note I (arguing for national regulations in
horseracing).
125. For a further discussion of a national license and national penalties, see
infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
126. For a further discussion of subcommittees in a national horseracing or-
ganization, see infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
127. For a discussion of how a national organization could relieve pressure on
agencies, see infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
128. See Heller, supra note 1 (pondering result if other professional sports
lacked national drug regulations).
129. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 183 (describing members of NCAA).
130. See id. (noting different powers of Council).
131. See id. (cataloging actions NCAA oversees and regulates).
132. See id. (describing enforcement of regulations).
133. See Martin, supra note 1, at 107-09 (discussing member institutions' pow-
ers within NCAA).
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agement Council, which then may forward it to members for their
reactions and suggestions.134 Then the Management Council sends
the proposal to the Board of Directors for approval. 135 Should the
Board reject it - or adopt it in spite of member disapproval - the
members have an opportunity to override the Board's decision with
a five-eighths majority vote at the annual NCAA Convention. 136
Like the NCAA, states could become voluntary members of the
national organization. 137 Trainers, owners and veterinarians that
seek uniformity could pressure their states into becoming mem-
bers, and once some states join, many others would likely follow
suit.1 38 Once states become members, the organization subse-
quently could create uniform licensing procedures so that viola-
tions of regulations could be uniformly enforced. 139
Additionally, the organization would also create subcommit-
tees, which could unify and empower current persuasive horserac-
ing authorities such as the Thoroughbred Horse Association,
Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Association, United Thor-
oughbred Trainers of America and American Quarter Horse Associ-
ation.140 Moreover, a committee resembling RMTC could guide
drug research and propose new tests, withdrawal periods and
mandatory publication when horses are administered certain
drugs.14 1
134. See id. at 108 (noting procedure for amendments and creating new
bylaws).
135. See id. (cataloging steps in creation of new rules of amendments to ex-
isting rules).
136. See id. at 108-09 (describing how voting members may override Board of
Directors in NCAA).
137. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 183 (noting that choosing to join NCAA means
accepting NCAA regulations).
138. See LaMarra, Racing Group Endorses Deadline, supra note 78 (noting
RMTC's wish for uniform adoption of rule across states).
139. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 183 (describing how NCAA's Committee on
Infractions has power to suspend members in violation of NCAA bylaws). To stay
analogous to the NCAA, a national horseracing organization could force member
states to uphold other members' suspensions; if a state refused, the organization
could suspend or revoke the state's membership. See id.
140. See id. (noting power of NCAA's Council to create subcommittees); see
also LaMarra, Racing Officials, supra note 4 (indicating several national agencies
have influence over state laws).
141. See LaMarra, Model Rule on Steroid Use Blasted, supra note 82 (reporting
view that model steroid regulation provides arbitrary link between threshold levels
and withdrawal times); see also Heller, supra note 1 (noting bettors until recently
remained ignorant of whether horses were on Lasix, which is arguably perform-
ance-enhancing drug). Heller also notes that many drugs lack an accurate test. See
id.
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Finally, a national horseracing organization with actual author-
ity could remove pressure from state agencies dealing with the vari-
ous competing interests of the state, the trainers and the track
owners. 142 Without the pressure of acting as a police power, state
agencies could focus on racing venues, revenues and generating in-
terest in what is perceived as a dying sport.
143
Furthermore, based on the NCAA model, the individual state
agencies would not forfeit all their power. 144 Rather, they would act
as representatives in a larger organization, with the ability to ad-
vance their own interests.145 Horseracing could shed corruption,
whether real or perceived, because the public would note that a
national organization is far more difficult for political entities pow-
erful in one state to penetrate when the organization's interest
must account for many different states. 146
Thus, a national horseracing organization based on the NCAA
structure provides the best of both worlds, as it would allow the
state agencies to retain their power while also implementing uni-
form rules, not the least of which would be performance-enhancing
drug regulations. 147 The other uniform implementation option -
leaving the problem to Congress - would completely remove all
power from the states. 148 Additionally, any regulations in place
would be far more difficult to amend or repeal if necessary. 149 Fur-
thermore, Congress' priorities would focus on the voting citizens
and their perceptions of horseracing rather than what is in the best
interest of the industry. 15 0
142. See, e.g., Handle Numbers Fall in Maryland in 2007, supra note 66 (reporting
decrease of six and one half percent); see also Post, supra note 66 (noting lack of
state funding as part of New York City Off-Track Betting's impending failure).
143. For a further discussion of agencies' police powers, see supra notes 23-37
and accompanying text. See also Handle Numbers Fall in Maryland in 2007, supra
note 66 (reporting decrease of six and one half percent); Post, supra note 66 (not-
ing lack of state funding as part of New York City Off-Track Betting's impending
failure).
144. See Martin, supra note 1, at 108-09 (describing NCAA members' voting
powers).
145. See id.
146. See Finley, supra note 75, at D1 (quoting medical director for California
Horse Racing Board who noted public reaction to steroids in sports).
147. See Martin, supra note 1, at 108-09 (discussing NCAA members' voting
powers); see also Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 183 (describing national implementation of
NCAA regulations).
148. For a further discussion of consequences of a congressional decision to
regulate steroids in horseracing, see infra notes 151-67 and accompanying text.
149. For a further discussion of passing new rules or amending existing rules
under a congressional statute, see infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
150. For a further discussion of whose interests Congress would reflect in a
statute, see infra notes 158-167 and accompanying text.
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C. Congressional Oversight
Even though individuals in the horseracing industry have
heated opinions about the model steroid rule, they all seem to
agree that a congressional statute regulating steroid use would be
insufferable. 151 What the industry seems to fear most is an outright
ban on all steroid use.15 2 Resistance to a ban in horseracing stems
from steroids' valuable therapeutic properties for injured horses. 153
This concern has led members of the NTRA to approach Congress
directly with the model steroid rule.' 54
The industry's fear is a valid apprehension, considering the
spotlight on steroids in Major League Baseball and the public's
clear disapprobation of such use in professional sports.' 55 Congress
already has partially regulated betting on horses under the Com-
merce Clause and thus may use this same power to regulate steroid
use, as horses are constantly crossing state lines to race. 1 56 While so
far the public has concentrated its disdain for steroid use among
baseball players, Congress could just as easily bring racehorses into
the spotlight as well. 15 7
This industry apprehension of regulation assumes, however,
that Congress would ban steroids outright. 158 Considering steroids'
151. See LaMarra, Model Rule on Steroid Use Blasted, supra note 82 (noting view
that model steroid regulation does not relate threshold levels to withdrawal times);
see also LaMarra, Racing Officials, supra note 4 (reporting on horseracing officials
meeting with Congressmen to discuss model steroid rule).
152. See LaMarra, Racing Officials, supra note 4 (noting fear of "blanket prohi-
bition" on steroids in horseracing).
153. See Hegarty, supra note 76 (discussing steroids' potential therapeutic ef-
fects). "U.S. veterinarians and trainers have said that the drugs have therapeutic
uses to help horses recover from exercise and restore appetite, although other
legal drugs - and rest - can also achieve the same effect." Id.
154. See LaMarra, Racing Officials, supra note 4 (reporting racing officials' im-
pressions after meeting with Congress).
155. See id. ("An impending Congressional hearing on steroid use in Major
League Baseball - and the possibility the inquiry could expand to other sports -
has led the Thoroughbred racing industry to take preemptive action on Capitol
Hill.").
156. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; 15 U.S.C. § 3002(13) (2008) (defining
parimutuel); see also Hegarty, supra note 75 (discussing fear of staggered imple-
mentation of model steroid rule due to horses traveling state to state).
157. See LaMarra, Racing Officials, supra note 4 (noting fear of congressional
ban on steroids in horseracing). NTRA chief executive officer, Alex Waldrop, said
in response as to whether horseracing would become part of the congressional
steroids discussion, "Is it a possibility? No question. Clearly steroid use is some-
thing Congress is concerned about in all professional athletics. Do I think we'll be
called [to testify]? It's hard to say, but I think we impressed them . . . ." Id.
158. See id. (reporting fear of blanket prohibition). "The word to (the racing
industry] is to act, or Congress will act forcefully .... A blanket prohibition would
not be practical for our industry." Id.
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obvious therapeutic value to injured horses, however, Congress is
unlikely to ban medical uses of the drugs.1 59 In fact, congressional
oversight could save the horseracing industry from spending re-
sources on the development of testing procedures and reasonable
withdrawal times if federal funding financed the research.' 60 Addi-
tionally, congressional oversight would have the some of the same
benefits as a national organization. 161 A federal statute would re-
solve the problem of uniformity.162 It could further remove pres-
sure from state agencies trying to balance the competing interests
of limiting steroid use of the state and the industry.
63
Unlike a national organization, however, a federal statute
would remove all power from the agencies.1 64 Agencies would no
longer possess any voting rights. 165 Instead, they would have to
lobby congressional representatives - who presumably would not
share the same expertise and understanding of leaders of a national
horseracing organization - in order to amend the steroid rule.
16 6
Furthermore, Congress remains focused on public perception
more than the actual needs of the industry, thus rendering policy
changes even more difficult.
167
159. See Hegarty, supra note 76 (noting veterinarians' and trainers' opinions
on therapeutic effects of steroids). The article also noted, however, that other
legal drugs and rest would benefit the horse in the same manner. See id.
160. See id. (reporting RMTC's funding research on steroids testing and with-
drawal times).
161. For a further discussion of benefits arising out creating a national horser-
acing organization, see supra notes 123-50 and accompanying text.
162. See Heller, supra note 1 (arguing for national regulations in
horseracing).
163. See, e.g., Handle Numbers Fall in Maryland in 2007, supra note 66 (reporting
decrease of six and one half percent); see also Post, supra note 66 (noting lack of
state funding as part of New York City Off-Track Betting's impending failure).
164. For a further discussion of how state agencies could retain some power
in a national organization, see supra notes 123-50 and accompanying text.
165. For a further discussion of how state agencies could retain voting rights
in a national organization, see supra notes 123-50 and accompanying text.
166. See LaMarra, Racing Officials, supra note 4 (reporting horseracing indus-
try officials lobbying on Capitol Hill to prevent Congress from regulating steroid
use in horseracing).
167. See Hegarty, supra note 76 (noting Waldrop's fear of Congressional over-
sight on steroids in horseracing). Considering that the horseracing industry is
concerned about the possibility of a federal statute to start lobbying Congress as a
preventative measure, it must also realize the difficulties of convincing Congress to
make any changes once Congress passes a statute. See id. As Waldrop said, "Given
the scrutiny of anabolic steroids by the media and Congress, and the consequential
negative perception of these drugs by the public, the horse racing industry must
take initiative on its own volition to properly and uniformly regulate the use of
anabolic steroids in racehorses this year." Id.
23
Gasparon: The Dark Horse of Drug Abuse: Legal Issues of Administering Perfo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009
222 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
IV. CONCLUSION
The horseracing industry has had its share of performance-en-
hancing drug problems, but only recently has the industry decided
to seriously address the prevalence of steroids.168 Thanks to Major
League Baseball's steroid debacle, horseracing authorities are not
only working on a model steroid rule, but are also cracking down
on the use of other prohibited drugs.1 69
Horseracing's recent history of enforcement of drug regula-
tions serves as an indicator for how the current model steroid rule
will fare.1 70 The recent Biancone affair signals the beginning of se-
rious enforcement of all drug regulations. 171 Furthermore, the in-
dustry's aggressive approach to Congress demonstrates its
seriousness about limiting steroid use in horses. 17 2
The industry's desire to eradicate its drug problem, however,
depends solely on the cooperation of each state's horseracing
agency. 173 This dependency creates problems of cooperation, uni-
formity, enforcement and research.1 7 4 To face these issues, each
state could agree to pass the same steroid rules and penalties, but
this does not mean the rules will be uniformly enforced. 75 Coordi-
nating all the states to pass the same steroid statute at the same time
is unlikely at best, impossible at worst. 176 State agencies may
counteract this issue by implementing other measures for deter-
rence, but ultimately each state is left to develop its regulations
without regard to any other state. 177
168. For a further discussion of trainers receiving sanctions for performance-
enhancing drugs other than steroids, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
169. For a further discussion of the effect of congressional interest in steroids
in professional baseball on the horseracing industry, see supra note 4 and accom-
panying text. See also Drape, supra note 43 (describing Biancone suspension as
example to other trainers).
170. For examples of enforcement of drug regulations, see supra notes 38-45
and accompanying text.
171. See Trainer Barred, supra note 2 (describing Biancone's sanction for dis-
covery of vials of cobra venom in his barn).
172. See LaMarra, Racing Officials, supra note 4 (reporting meeting between
Congressmen and horseracing officials on steroid use in horses).
173. For a discussion on the power of state agencies to regulate horseracing
within its states, see supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
174. For a further discussion of the problems presented by lack of a national
organization presents, see supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
175. For a further discussion of state agencies' discretion in enforcing drug
regulations, see supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
176. See Hegarty, supra note 76 (detailing lack of uniformity across states in
regulating steroids administered to horses).
177. For a further discussion of other methods to deter drug use without na-
tional standards, see supra notes 92-122 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the optimal remedy is to create a national organization
based on the NCAA model.178 In this type of organization, the state
agencies could still retain their power while implementing the same
rules uniformly. 179 This would also provide a singular approach to
both research and enforcement.180 Perhaps most importantly, the
organization would have the horseracing industry's best interests at
heart. 18 1
Should Congress choose to intervene in steroid use across all
professional sports, the state agencies would not have any power,
except to petition Congress for change. 182 The horseracing indus-
try fears an outright ban on steroids, but this is unlikely considering
steroids' therapeutic effects are common knowledge.1 83 While a
federal statute would solve the problem of uniformity, it would also
be antithetical to the industry's needs, as Congress remains more
concerned with the general public.'
84
Therefore, considering the ineffectiveness of prohibiting per-
formance-enhancing drugs through various statutes among states,
the most practical remedy is to create a national organization where
states are members. 18 5 Doing so would relieve the industry of its
two concerns: uniform enforcement and keeping Congress out of
its stables. 186
Kimberli Gasparon*
178. For a further discussion of the benefits to creating a national horserac-
ing organization in which state are members, see supra notes 123-50 and accompa-
nying text.
179. For a further discussion on how legislation within a national organiza-
tion could work based on the NCAA model, see supra notes 123-50 and accompa-
nying text.
180. For a further discussion of benefits to having a national horseracing or-
ganization, see supra notes 123-63 and accompanying text.
181. For a detailed comparison between a theoretical national organization's
interests and Congress's interests, see supra notes 164-84 and accompanying text.
182. For a further discussion of the consequences should a federal statute
regulating steroid use in horseracing go into effect, see supra notes 151-67 and
accompanying text.
183. For a further discussion of why Congress would unlikely prohibit all ster-
oids in horseracing, see supra note 157 and accompanying text.
184. For a further discussion of Congress's interests, see supra note 167 and
accompanying text.
185. For a further discussion of the benefits of a national horseracing organi-
zation, see supra notes 123-50 and accompanying text.
186. For a detailed comparison of the effects of a federal statute versus a na-
tional organization, versus no national statute at all, see supra notes 168-86 and
accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 2005,
University of Michigan.
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